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Here one can only describe and say: 
 this is what human life is 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough)
1
  
 
ABSTRACT: The paper intends to clarify the use that 
Wittgenstein makes, in various moments and contexts, 
of the adjective “problematic” and of the adjective-used-
as-a-noun “the problematic”, as well as to demonstrate 
that this clarification may teach a lot on the aims and 
spirit of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method. 
Particularly, the paper drives at exposing (a) that what 
Wittgenstein names “the disappearing of the 
problematic” is, at one and the same time, his primary 
ethical goal and the main purpose of his philosophic 
method; (b) that referring to this purpose, both ethical 
and philosophical, one can better understand some 
peculiar aspects of his philosophical method, in 
particular his repetitive claim of immediacy, which shall 
be identified with the invitation that covers his entire 
philosophy: “to regard what appears so obviously 
incomplete, as something complete”.  
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Premise 
 
The scholarly literature on Wittgenstein rarely points out 
the use that – at different times and places in his 
writings – he makes of the adjective “problematic” 
(problematisch) and of the adjective-used-as-a-noun 
“the problematic” (das Problematische). In this essay, I 
would like to amend this (partial) inattention,
2
 
particularly believing that a clarification of this use can 
teach a lot, both in general and in detail, on the aims and 
spirit of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method. 
More in depth, in the first two sections I would like 
to demonstrate that (1) it is exactly the disappearing of 
the problematic which constitutes the principal aim of 
                                                 
1
 Wittgenstein 1993, 121. 
2
 With regard to the Wittgensteinian notion of 
(philosophical) problem see Kuusela 2008. 
(his) philosophical method, while at the same time the 
disappearing of the problematic is (his) principal ethical 
aim too; an aim that – may one be a professional 
philosopher or not – is fulfilled when one is “in 
agreement with the world” (Wittgenstein 1979, 75; 8 
July 1916),
3
 that is, when one lives what another passage 
of the Notebooks 1914-1916 calls “the life of 
knowledge”;
4
 in the last section I shall show (2) that it is 
precisely this aim (the disappearing of the problematic) 
that may clarify why it is philosophically so important to 
Wittgenstein (a) to reject that “contemptuous attitude
5
 
towards the particular case” which, in his analysis, stems 
from the idea that the particular case is incomplete 
(Wittgenstein 1969a, 18-19) and (b) to renounce – as 
difficult as it may be – all theory in order “to regard what 
appears so obviously incomplete, as something 
complete” (Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §723).  
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, if regarded from the 
perspective of its method, contains – we may say or 
maintain synthetically – a kind of peculiar call to 
immediacy: immediate is what we look at as complete, 
although incomplete (“obviously incomplete”) it may 
seem, if considered from the perspective of theory (of 
science or of metaphysics; that is, of philosophy as a 
science). To the scientist or the metaphysicist that 
                                                 
3
 “In order to live happily I must be in agreement with 
the world. And that is what ‘being happy’ means” 
(Wittgenstein 1979, 75; 8 July 1916). “I am in agreement 
with the world” means, in the language of religion, “I am 
doing the will of God”. (Wittgenstein 1979, 75).  
4
 “The good conscience is the happiness that the life of 
knowledge preserves. / The life of knowledge is the life 
that is happy in spite of the misery of the world. / The 
only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the 
amenities of the world. / To it the amenities of the world 
are so many graces of fate” (Wittgenstein 1979, 81; 13 
August 1916). The knowledge implied in the expression 
“the life of knowledge” isn’t, evidently, scientific 
knowledge. Let’s recall here that, according to the 
Tractatus logico-philosophicus, “[p]hilosophy is not one 
of the natural science”; indeed, “[p]hilosophy is not a 
body of doctrine but an activity” whose aim is “the 
logical clarification of thoughts” (Wittgenstein 1974, 
4.111 and 4.112).  
5
 It is by no means irrelevant that, in order to describe 
the philosophical behaviour he wants to resist, 
Wittgenstein makes use of an adjective 
(“contemptuous”) and a noun (“contempt”), which are 
markedly ethical. 
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affirm: If you don’t complete it, you won’t understand it, 
indeed Wittgenstein wants to reply and induces us to 
rebuke: “If you complete it, you falsify it” (Wittgenstein 
1980a, I, §257). Hence, that of Wittgenstein is not a 
philosophy of immediacy, even though a call to 
immediacy is one means of his philosophical method. 
 
Wittgenstein and the problem of life 
 
As far as our aim is concerned, the first occurrence of 
the adjective “problematic” is in the Notebooks 1914-
1916, more precisely in an annotation of July 6, 1916. In 
this context the adjective “problematic”, referred to life 
and its meaning,
6
 appears in a question that is almost 
the Leitmotiv of many annotations in these difficult 
months of Wittgenstein’s life:
7
 “But is it possible for one 
so to live that life stops being problematic?” 
(Wittgenstein 1979, 74).
8
 As becomes clear in the 
subsequent annotation, to ask whether it is possible to 
live as if life ceased to be problematic means for 
Wittgenstein to ask if (and how) it may be possible to 
live “in eternity and not in time” (Wittgenstein 1979, 74). 
However, we ourselves could ask, why a life in time 
should be problematic? And in what respect and what 
for a life in eternity would be any different from a life in 
time? And what does it mean to live in eternity? 
                                                 
6
 In this regard, see also the annotation of June 11, 1916: 
“What do I know about God and the purpose of life? / I 
know that this world exists. / […] / That something about 
it is problematic, which we call its meaning (Sinn)” 
(Wittgenstein 1979, 72-73).  
7
 We should keep in mind that already in August 1914, 
that is, at the outbreak of World War I, Wittgenstein 
volunteered in the Austrian–Hungarian army and that 
since then he had actively taken part to the warfare on 
the Eastern front, often in difficult and dangerous 
conditions. With regard to Wittgenstein’s war 
experience and the meaning it may hold see McGuinness 
1988, 204-266.  
8
 It deserves to be noted that this question resonates in 
a famous paragraph of the Philosophical Investigations, 
although this time with regard to philosophy and not to 
life: “The real discovery [in philosophy] is the one […] 
that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer 
tormented by questions which bring itself in question” 
(Wittgenstein 2009, I, §133).  
The answer between the lines of the Notebooks 
1914-1916 is that someone definitely lives in time, when 
oscillating with regard to the meaning of life, between 
“not anymore” and “not yet”, between nostalgia of a 
supposedly lost meaning and hope of a meaning yet to 
be discovered.
9
 In any case, what appears relevant to 
notice is that the solution to the problem of life – both 
for the one who looks back at the origin and for the one 
that observes the future – is (supposing it is) never in the 
life that we are now living. It may be clear, then, why 
living “in eternity” or living “eternally” are the same to 
Wittgenstein as living “in the present”, of course “[i]f by 
eternity is understood non infinite temporal duration 
but non-temporality” (Wittgenstein 1979, 75); but it may 
even be possible to understand how he could write, in 
an annotation a month earlier, that there is only one 
way to become “independent of the world – and so in a 
certain sense master it – by renouncing any influence on 
happenings (auf die Geschehnisse)” (Wittgenstein 1979, 
73; June 1916).
10
 As a matter of fact, those who try to 
influence the events necessarily live in time; that is, 
between the hope that events shall correspond to their 
desires and that they shall serve to fulfil their projects, 
and the fear that these events may miss the former and 
fail the latter. After all, as pointed out by the Tractatus in 
                                                 
9
 Both nostalgia as well as hope are accompanied by 
fear: the fear of a permanent loss of that sense or the 
fear that sense will never be discovered. It is indeed for 
this reason that “[w]hoever lives in the present lives 
without fear and hope” (Wittgenstein 1979, 76; 14 July 
1916).  
10
 This annotation recalls other annotations which date 
back to the late Summer of 1914 and are now published 
in the so-called Geheimene Tagebücher: “Nur eines ist 
nötig: Alles, was einem geschieht, betrachten”; “Habe 
mir gestern Vorgenommen, keinen Widerstand zu 
leisten”; “Mein Vorhaben der vollkommenen Passivität 
habe ich noch nicht recht ausgeführt”; “Zur 
vollkommenen Passivität habe ich mich noch nicht 
entschlossen” [“Just one thing is necessary: To observe 
everything, that happens to someone”; “Obliged myself 
yesterday, not to make any resistance”; “Did not yet 
carry out my plan of absolute passivity”; “I did not yet 
make up my mind to absolute passivity” ] (Wittgenstein 
1991, annotations of August 25, 26 and 29 and of 
September 6, 1914).  
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one of its most suggestive passages, “[e]ven if all that we 
wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour 
granted by fate, so to speak” (Wittgenstein 1974, 
6.374).
11
 Desires, one should say, are merely prayers. 
A second occurrence of the adjective “problematic” 
as well as of the adjective-used-as-a-noun “the 
problematic” can be found in a remark now published in 
Culture and Value. The first three paragraphs of this 
remark, dated 27 August 1937, read as follows:  
 
Slept a bit better. Vivid dreams. A bit depressed; 
weather & state of health. / The solution of the 
problem you see in life is a way of living which 
makes what is problematic disappear. / The fact 
that life is problematic means that your life does 
not fit life’s shape (die Form des Lebens). So you 
must change your life, & once it fits the shape, 
what is problematic (das Problematische) will 
disappear (Wittgenstein 2006, 31). 
 
As in the Notebooks 1914-1916, here too Wittgenstein 
deals with the problem of life, 
12
 although the diagnosis 
is – at least partially – different:
13
 in 1916, problematic is 
the life of those who live “in time”; in 1931, problematic 
becomes – so it seems – the life that “does not fit life’s 
shape”. However, there is the same belief that life’s 
problem is not of a scientific or cognitive nature
14
 and 
                                                 
11
 Indeed, Wittgenstein continues saying, “there is no 
logical connexion between the will and the world, which 
could guarantee it, and the supposed physical connexion 
itself is surely not something that we could will” 
(Wittgenstein 1974, 6.374). Proposition 6.374 is a 
comment on proposition 6.37: “There is no compulsion 
making one thing happen because another has 
happened. The only necessity that exists is logical 
necessity”.  
12
 Obviously the circumstances differed a lot. In 1931 
Wittgenstein was in Cambridge with a fellowship, thus in 
a condition which – at least at an outward look – was 
very different from the one he found himself in 1916. 
With regard to this period of Wittgenstein’s life, see 
Monk 1991, 255-280. 
13
 Even the formulation is slightly different: “the problem 
of life” becomes here “the problem you see in life”.  
14
 “It is certainly not the solution of any problems of 
natural science that is required” (Wittgenstein 1974, 
6.4312). “The facts all contribute only to setting the 
problem, not to its solution” (Wittgenstein 1974, 
6.4321). 
the certainty that its solution does not depend on a 
major or better knowledge of facts, be they physical, 
biological, psychological, historical etc. Hence, life is not 
a problem because we still don’t know enough or 
because we ignore many things yet, about ourselves, 
nature, history etc. Indeed, as can be found in the 
Tractatus, “[h]ow things are in the world is a matter of 
complete indifference for what is higher” (Wittgenstein 
1974, 6.432).
15
 It is thus by no means a chance that in 
these annotations of 1931 Wittgenstein reiterates – 
almost to the letter – what he maintained already in the 
Notebooks 1914-1916 (Wittgenstein 1979, 74) and later 
in the Tractatus, that is that “[t]he solution of the 
problem of life is to be seen in the disappearance of this 
problem” (Wittgenstein 1974, 6.521).
16
  
One still needs to ask, though, how life should 
change according to Wittgenstein in order for the 
problematic to disappear. At a first glance we may think 
he is recalling – in a slightly Platonic or Platonist manner 
– a sort of conflict between ideal and real, as if he 
intended that such a life is problematic, which is not how 
it should be and, thus, is not entirely or in its deepest 
sense life. However, there are various reasons to hold 
this interpretation implausible. Primarily the reason is 
the divide between ideal and real, as with other divides – 
for instance the one between interior and exterior
17
 – 
always was a main critical target of Wittgenstein. 
Coherently, according to this stance, we shouldn’t say 
life is a problem since it doesn’t correspond to its ideal, 
but rather that those who live life as a problem produce 
                                                 
15
 The continuation of proposition 6.432 (“God does not 
reveal himself in the world”) suggests one should 
consider “what is higher” (das Höhere) and “God” as 
synonyms; however, we must not forget that in the 
Notebooks 1914-1916 Wittgenstein wrote “The meaning 
of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God” 
(Wittgenstein 1979, 73; 11 June 1916).  
16
 “Is not this the reason – observes Wittgenstein in 
brackets – why those who have found after a long period 
of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them 
have then been unable to say what constituted that 
sense?” (Wittgenstein 1974, 6.521).  
17
 On Wittgenstein’s attitude toward the inner-outer 
divide see, for instance, ter Hark 2001. 
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– so to speak – the split between real and ideal. Even 
disguised as a discovery or vision, here the ideal is 
nothing but a need or requirement generated by our 
own dissatisfaction towards life; and this dissatisfaction 
eventually and simply grows, as Wittgenstein clearly 
demonstrates in the Philosophical Investigations, when 
addressing that conviction that logic has to do with an 
ideal language “supposed to be something pure and 
clear-cut”, instead of our actual language. (Wittgenstein 
2009, I, §105). Here he writes, thinking also but not 
exclusively of the Tractatus: 
 
The more closely we examine actual language, 
the greater becomes the conflict between it and 
our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of 
logic was, of course, not something I had 
discovered: it was a requirement). The conflict 
becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in 
danger of becoming vacuous” (Wittgenstein 
2009, I, §107).
18
  
 
The life which, through change, fits its shape cannot thus 
be the life which is finally in accordance with the ideal, 
but the life that – so to speak – is in accordance with 
itself; that is, the life which again according to the 
Notebooks 1914-1916 “no longer needs to have any 
purpose except to live” (Wittgenstein 1979, 73; 6 July 
1916). 
With regard to life as well as to language, hence, 
Platonism with its divide between ideal and real is but a 
symptom, perhaps even a cause of the problem, and 
hardly ever (only) the beginning of the solution. It is by 
no means a chance that Wittgenstein thought precisely 
of Socrates when he was trying to understand why; in 
the years of the Tractatus, in addressing the problems of 
logic he was experiencing what Russell felt (as he often 
did in their conversations) when exclaiming “Logic’s 
hell’”, “namely their immense difficulty. Their hardness – 
                                                 
18
 The paragraph continues as follows: "We have got on 
to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a 
certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just 
because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to 
walk; so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!" 
(Wittgenstein 2009, I, §107). 
their hard & slippery texture” (Wittgenstein 2006, 35; 1 
October 1937). Wittgenstein seemingly maintains that at 
the origin of their mutual experience was the fact “that 
each new phenomenon of language that they might 
retrospectively think of could show their earlier 
explanation to be unworkable” (Wittgenstein 2006, 35). 
This is precisely the moment when Socrates comes in. 
 
But that – he writes – is the difficulty Socrates 
gets caught up when he tries to give the 
definition of a concept. Again and again an 
application of word emerges that seems not to 
be compatible with the concept to which other 
application have led us. We say but that isn’t 
how it is! – it is like that though! – & all we can 
do is keep repeating these antitheses” 
(Wittgenstein 2006, 35). 
 
It isn’t difficult to imagine the reader’s objections at the 
first few paragraphs of the annotations dated August 27, 
1937, which are being scrutinised. One could object, for 
instance, that the life from which the problematic 
eventually disappears is the life that settles for how it 
always lived or the life of whom, instead of living, is 
being lived. According to political language, this person 
would be a conservative bourgeois; someone who 
substituted “status” with “life” and of whom could be 
said what Wittgenstein observed on Frank Ramsey; that 
is, “[t]he idea that this state might not be the only 
possible one partly disquieted him and partly bored him” 
(Wittgenstein 2006, 24).
19
 Wittgenstein was absolutely 
conscious of this possible or even very predictable 
reaction; a reaction he was not insensitive to, as the two 
questions following the aforementioned paragraphs 
demonstrate: 
 
                                                 
19
 Wittgenstein begins this annotation on November 11, 
1931, defining Ramsey “a bourgeois thinker” 
(Wittgenstein 1979, 24). The topic of the relationship 
and reciprocal influence between Ramsey and 
Wittgenstein is such an interesting one, as much as it is a 
complex one which, in any case, goes far beyond our 
brief quote, further involving the more general question 
of Wittgenstein’s relationship to pragmatism. Many 
useful indications may now be found in Misak 2016.  
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But don’t we have the feeling that someone who 
doesn’t see a problem there [in his or her life] is 
blind to something important, indeed to what is 
most important of all? / Wouldn’t I like to say he 
is living aimlessly – just blindly like a mole as it 
were; & if he could only see, he would see the 
problem? (Wittgenstein 2006, 31).  
 
In reading this passage, it almost appears there is no 
alternative between seeing the problem and living 
“blindly like a mole”. Hence, since no one fancies to be 
blind like a mole, it seems we must accept living life like 
a problem. With due caution,
20
 Wittgenstein attempts 
though to offer an escape that consists in distinguishing 
between two modes of experimenting the problem of 
life; he observes that it can be lived “as sorrow”, as a 
sort of “murky background”, that is “as a problem”, but 
that some may even live it “as joy”, that is “as a bright 
halo round his life”. Only one who “lives rightly”, 
Wittgenstein suggests, experiments the problem as joy 
and, thus, “not after all as a problem” (Wittgenstein 
2006, 31).  
The fact that life is a problem doesn’t implicate that 
it shall also be that it is a problem that life is a problem. 
The problem of life, one could say, is a first order 
problem that needs to be separated from that second 
order problem, which is the problem that life is a 
problem. Only those who are capable to do this – that is, 
not to live as if the problem of life was a problem – live 
the problem as joy, meaning they live it as a part of life 
and not as sorrow, not as something that brings life itself 
into in question.
21
  
An annotation that follows slightly after may help us 
to focus better the point, when Wittgenstein observes 
that today’s situation is such “that ordinary common 
sense no longer suffices to meet the strange demands 
life makes”. Indeed, while in the past (for instance in 
traditional societies) it sufficed “to be able to play the 
game well”, today “the question is again and again: what 
                                                 
20
 This last paragraph begins, in fact, with a cautious “Or 
shouldn’t I say” (Wittgenstein 2006, 31).  
21
 For this formulation, see the passage of the 
Philosophical Investigations quoted in footnote 8.  
sort of game is to be played now anyway?” 
(Wittgenstein 2006, 31). This is the problem we have 
now; living this problem as joy means thus living it as a 
part of the life we are living, acknowledging there is no 
way to live this life and, together, deny the question: 
“what sort of game is to be played now anyway?”. One 
could say that those who live this problem as joy accept 
life and, thus, accept its problem, while those who live it 
as sorrow find in this problem something besetting and 
threatening, like “a murky background”. In a language 
reminiscent of Nietzsche, we could say that the first ones 
say yes to life, while the second ones say no instead. Or 
less emphatically, that one thing are the problems in life 
and another one is life as a problem. 
 
From the problem of life to the method of philosophy 
 
What connects though these observations of 
Wittgenstein on the problem of life to the way of 
intending and practising philosophy? A first hint can be 
found in an annotation of June 29, 1930, which was also 
collected in Culture and Value. The annotation is made 
of two long sentences, the first one being very similar in 
tone and content to the previously scrutinised remarks. 
This is what they maintain, in fact: 
 
If anyone should think he has solved the problem 
of life & feels like telling himself everything is 
quite easy now, he need only tell himself, in order 
to see that he is wrong, that there was a time 
when “this” solution had not been discovered; but 
it must have been possible to live then too & the 
solution which has now been discovered appears 
in relation to how things were then like an 
accident (Wittgenstein 2006, 6).  
 
Here Wittgenstein dispenses a sort of test to anyone 
who thinks he or she eventually found the solution to 
the problem of life; a test that can be easily explained 
with an example. Indeed, we could compare the solution 
to the problem of life to the invention of the car. 
Obviously, before the car was invented, humans did not 
travel by car, although they travelled over lands and sea, 
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and they surely lived before the supposed solution to 
the problem of life was discovered. This demonstrates 
that maintaining that one really lives only once the 
discovery is made, is like asserting that humans really 
travelled only after the car was invented and that before 
their travelling wasn’t a real travel. To whom should 
anyway say so, in fact, it could be pointed out that – as 
far as travelling in the past is concerned – the invention 
of the car appears “like an accident”. In conclusion, in 
order to travel, humans did not wait for the invention of 
the car, although this invention affected and even deeply 
changed their way of travelling. 
I dare say, in Wittgenstein’s eyes those who believe 
they have solved the problem of life are essentially – 
perhaps even unaware – Platonists that reject into 
appearance all life before this discovery and believe that 
they can say anyone who lived before this discovery 
didn’t live or did so only in appearance. 
Then, in the second sentence of this annotation, 
Wittgenstein extends these considerations to logic (to 
philosophy) observing that what he said on the problem 
of life is true even for the idea that there is a “solution to 
the problems of logic (philosophy)” or, to put it 
differently, for the idea that logical (philosophical) 
problems were identical or, at least, similar to those of 
science:  
 
And it is the same for us in logic too. If there were 
a “solution to a problems of logic (philosophy)” we 
should only have to caution ourselves that there 
was a time when they had not been solved (and 
then too it must have been possible to live and 
think) – (Wittgenstein 2006, 6).  
 
Here Wittgenstein is expressing a belief that animates 
his philosophising, from the beginning to the end. For 
instance, in the Philosophical Remarks written in the 
same period there is a passage in which clearly this spirit 
shines through: 
 
 
How strange if logic were concerned with an 
‘ideal’ language and not with ours. / […] Logical 
analysis is the analysis of something we have, 
not of something we don’t have. Therefore it is 
the analysis of propositions as they stand. (It 
would be odd if the human race had been 
speaking all this time without even putting 
together a genuine proposition.) (Wittgenstein 
1975, §3).
22
  
 
Let’s reiterate: the solution to a logical (philosophical) 
problem is not like a scientific discovery or invention. 
Surely, only after the invention of the telephone one 
could communicate to a friend in New York, while being 
at home in Milan; however, we definitely don’t have to 
wait until all problems of logic are solved to finally put a 
genuine proposition together. Therefore, it comes as no 
surprise that the Philosophical Investigations maintain 
“[t]he name ‘philosophy’ might […] be given to what is 
possible before all new discoveries and inventions” 
(Wittgenstein 2009, I, §126). 
The last occurrence of the expression “das 
Problematische” that we will analyse is to be found, in 
fact, in the Philosophical Investigations and it belongs to 
an observation not explicitly pertaining to the problem 
of life, but directly to the question of the philosophical 
method. Here it is: 
 
Don’t take it as a matter of course, but as a 
remarkable fact, that pictures and fictitious 
narratives give us pleasure, absorb us. / (“Don’t 
take it as a matter of course”—that means: 
puzzle over this [Wundere dich darüber], as you 
do over some other things which disturb you. 
Then what is problematic [das Problematische] 
will disappear, by your accepting the one fact as 
you do the other.) (Wittgenstein 2009, I, §524). 
 
 
                                                 
22
 In turn, this passage refers to one of the most famous 
propositions of the Tractatus: “In fact, all the 
propositions of our everyday language, just as they 
stand, are in perfect logical order. – That utterly simple 
thing, which we have to formulate here, is not a likeness 
of the truth, but the truth itself in its entirety. / (Our 
problems are not abstract, but perhaps the most 
concrete that there are.)” (Wittgenstein 1974, 5.5563).  
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Here, taking for instance the fact that pictures (o 
fictitious narratives) give us pleasure and absorb us, 
Wittgenstein is showing two possible attitudes as 
regards facts and invites us to take a stance for the 
second one: “Don’t take it as… but as…”. The first 
attitude consists in taking “as a matter of course” the 
fact that pictures (or fictitious narratives) give us 
pleasure or absorb us. Indeed, who would ever deny 
this?. Don’t we perhaps feel pleasure admiring the View 
of Delft by Johann Vermeer? Or are we not absorbed by 
reading the Great Expectations of Charles Dickens? That 
it is so or that this happens, thus, is no problem; the true 
problem – one might be tempted to say – is why it is so 
or why this happens and (in case) which science may 
give us a convincing explanation: psychology, most 
recent neurosciences or perhaps sociology? What really 
interests here, it seems, is not the fact that pictures give 
us pleasure, but rather why they do, as if in the absence 
of an explanation that pleasure was – so to speak – 
suspended over the void. Here “why?” prevails over 
“that”, so much so that Wittgenstein is led to compare 
those who always ask “why?” to those “tourists, who 
stand in front of building, reading Baedeker [a famous 
German tourist guide], & through reading about the 
history of the building’s construction etc. etc. are 
prevented from seeing it” (Wittgenstein 2006, 46).
23
  
Of course asking “why?” and attempting to answer is 
not wrong in itself. After all, seeking an explanation, 
making a hypothesis and elaborating a theory are a 
constitutional part of that scientific behaviour, which – 
taken as such – Wittgenstein has nothing to blame for. 
What he criticises, in case, is the assumption that this is 
the only legitimate mode to look at facts; and in 
particular the belief that a fact ceases to be 
“remarkable” or “astounding” once it is explained 
scientifically: 
 
 
                                                 
23
 In this regard, see Genova 1995, 65.  
As though today [that is, in a time when we have 
a scientific explanation with regard to lightening] 
lightning were more commonplace or less 
astounding than 2000 years ago (Wittgenstein 
2006, 7).  
 
In any case, it is part of Wittgenstein’s method to induce 
(or persuade) us to consider those facts remarkable, 
which we usually don’t see, either because we take them 
as a matter of course or because we are so occupied 
with explaining them. It is as if, for instance, in wishing 
to explain why pictures give us pleasure, we forgot about 
the fact – taken as obvious or irrelevant – that pictures 
give us pleasure. For this reason, he insistently calls to 
look and surprise oneself: “Let yourself be struck by…”,
24
 
“To repeat: don’t think, but look!” (Wittgenstein 2009, I, 
§66a); and hence suppress this way – at least when 
philosophising – the question “Why?”, convinced as he 
was that “[o]ften it is only when we suppress the 
question ‘Why?’ that we become aware of those 
important facts, which then, in the course of our 
investigation, lead to an answer” (Wittgenstein 2009, I, 
§471). 
It should be noted anyway that Wittgenstein doesn’t 
mean we should leave things unanswered, nor is he 
taking ignorance for the philosopher’s virtue.
25
 This 
would make the philosopher plainly – and sadly – a non-
scientist. The philosopher’s task is rather subtracting 
facts – particularly those he calls “facts of living” 
(Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §630) – from the obviousness 
that conceals them, but without for this reason 
delivering them straight away to that other form of 
concealing that is – for Wittgenstein – the scientific 
explanation. 
Furthermore, it isn’t at all easy to recognise facts, 
such as the often mentioned fact that pictures give us 
pleasure. On the contrary, it is a matter of investigating, 
closely and in detail, the concept of pleasure that is at 
                                                 
24
 “Let yourself be struck by the existence of a such a 
thing as our language-game of confessing the motive of 
my action” (Wittgenstein 2009, II, xi, §334). 
25
 As appears to think Fogelin 1987, 209-210. 
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work here, asking ourselves, for example, what place it 
occupies and how it is incorporated “in all of the 
situations and reactions which constitute human life” 
(Wittgenstein 1980b: II, §16), but also whether it refers 
exclusively to phenomena of human life.
26
 For example, 
what would we say about a puppy that wags its tail in 
front of Vermeer's View of Delft: does it take pleasure? If 
not, why not? Or if so, why so? Or would we say it most 
certainly takes pleasure, but not in the picture. And does 
“in front of” have the same meaning in “the puppy is in 
front of the View of Delft” and in “my friend Paul is in 
front of the View of Delft”? And when Paul tells me 
about the pleasure Vermeer's picture gave him, is he 
using the same concept as when he tells me about his 
pleasure during a swim in the open sea? How can I 
decide? Where should I look? Or should I ask Paul 
himself? Hence, while it is true that the facts of living are 
“[w]hat has to be accepted” or they are – as one could 
also say – “the given” (Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §630), it is 
also true that, in order to accept them, it is necessary to 
know how to see them, since they are “hidden because 
of their simplicity and familiarity” (Wittgenstein 2009, I, 
§129).
27
 
 
Completeness and incompleteness  
 
In the Blue Book Wittgenstein devotes a few pages to 
what he calls “our craving for generality” (Wittgenstein 
1969a, 17)
28
 that coincides with what could be also 
named “the contemptuous attitude towards the 
                                                 
26
 “‘Human beings think, grasshoppers don’t.’ This 
means something like: the concept 'thinking' refers to 
human life, not to that of grasshoppers" (Wittgenstein 
1980, II, §23). 
27
 Wittgenstein adds in the same paragraph that “we fail 
to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and 
most powerful” (Wittgenstein 2009, I, §129).  
28
 According to Wittgenstein, among the main sources of 
our craving for generality there is “our preoccupation with 
the method of science […] the method of reducing the 
explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest 
possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in 
mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics 
by using a generalization” (Wittgenstein 1969a, 18).  
particular case” (Wittgenstein 1969a, 18); which, as we 
already recalled in the premise, “springs from the idea 
that it [the particular or special or less general case] is 
incomplete” (Wittgenstein 1969a, 19).  
The example he uses to depict this point is 
particularly effective. Let’s consider a treatise on 
pomology. Of such a treatise we can say that it is 
incomplete, if it doesn’t mention this or that type of 
apple; for instance, if it doesn’t mention the fruits of the 
European crab apple (Malus sylvestris).
29
 In the case of a 
treatise on pomology, thus, “we have a standard of 
completeness in nature” (Wittgenstein 1969a, 19). But 
let’s consider now the game of chess and compare it 
with two very similar games: one without pawns and the 
other one with more pieces. Would we be inclined to 
maintain that the first game is an incomplete game (with 
regard to our game) or that the second one is a more 
complete game (than ours)? A game without pawns is 
perhaps like a treatise on pomology that doesn’t 
mention the fruits of the Malus sylvestris? Obviously we 
could always affirm that only the game of chess with 
pawns is complete; and that the first one (that without 
pawns) is incomplete and the second one (that with 
more pieces) is redundant, but we may do this only to 
reiterate that this is our game (the game we are playing 
or that we want to play); or to invoke an ideal of 
completeness that appears clear only because or until it 
is left unexpressed. 
As a matter of fact, why should a game without 
pawns be considered incomplete? Or why would the 
addition of pawns render it complete, making it a game 
eventually? Surely, the game without pawns could be 
treated like an easier game or a more primitive one than 
ours, maybe because there are less pieces to be put on 
the board or perhaps since we noticed it is usually 
quicker to learn how to play. In any case, that game 
without pawns – be it simpler or more primitive than 
ours – “bears no mark of incompleteness” (Wittgenstein 
                                                 
29
 The example of the fruits of Malus sylvestris is mine. 
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1969, 19).
30
 If it is played, it is by all means a game, even 
if it isn’t our game. 
The key point of Wittgenstein’s considerations could 
here be expressed as follows: to say that it isn’t our 
game is not the same as saying that it isn’t yet (or 
completely) a game; or otherwise: that the presence of 
pawns in our game doesn’t make a game without pawn a 
“not–yet–a–game” or an incomplete game. The only 
concession could be that, given the two games, it is very 
likely we might chose the one with pawns. Anyway, the 
game without pawns is so little incomplete as much as 
was our language “before the symbolism of chemistry 
and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were 
incorporated in to it” (Wittgenstein 2009, I, §18); or, 
consequently, so little as much as our actual language 
is.
31
  
“To regard what appears so obviously incomplete, as 
something complete” (Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §723), is 
far from easy, as Wittgenstein explains well in an 
annotation from the previously quoted Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology:  
 
[O]ne believes that one needs to fill out the facts 
in order to understand them. It is as if one saw a 
screen with scattered colour-patches, and said: 
the way they are here, that are unintelligible; 
they only make sense when one completes them 
into a shape. – Whereas I want to say: Here is 
the whole. (If you complete it, you falsify it.) 
(Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §257).  
  
Wittgenstein’s variations on this point are a lot and of 
particular interest. For instance, he shows to think it 
little fruitful to look at the “feeble-minded” as to 
incomplete or lacking humans, as becomes clear in a 
                                                 
30
 Here Wittgenstein is thinking especially about the 
tendency “to talk of arithmetic as something special as 
opposed to something more general. Cardinal arithmetic 
bears no mark of incompleteness; nor does an arithmetic 
which is cardinal and finite” (Wittgenstein 1969a, 19).  
31
 Would you be ready to say that our language is 
incomplete, because we surely cannot rule out the 
possibility that in the future new symbolisms and 
calculations may be included? 
little quoted passage, which could well stimulate 
psychologists and psychiatrists: 
 
The feeble-minded are pictured in our 
imagination as degenerate, essentially 
incomplete, as it were in rags. Thus as in a state 
of disorder, rather than more primitive order 
(which would be a far more fruitful way of 
looking at them.) (Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §646). 
 
However, he also seems to hold it as misleading or little 
fruitful to look at animals not as animals, but as non–
humans; or as beings that bare in them a mark of 
incompleteness and that will never become humans. Of 
particular interest are in this regard a series of questions 
on children, cats and squirrels, which appear in On 
Certainty:  
 
Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it 
know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a 
mouse exists? (Wittgenstein 1969b, §478).  
 
What Wittgenstein wants to reckon is that it is 
meaningless to maintain that, when it is hungry, the 
child tends towards the maternal breast, because he 
believes or knows that milk exists; the like it makes no 
sense saying the cat hunts the mouse, because the 
thinks or knows the mouse exists; above all, however, he 
wants us to ask, why we are tempted to add that 
“because he believes or knows” and why we are not 
satisfied to ascertain that cats hunt mice and children 
suck milk. Here, though, some may rebut saying that 
matters simply are as follows: children and cats don’t 
know, in fact they are children and cats; the former 
aren’t human yet and the latter never will. Only humans 
(speak adults) know, while children don’t know yet and 
animals will never know: the child sucks milk “without 
thinking” the same as the cat hunts the mouse “without 
thinking”. Wittgenstein’s answer goes that many human 
behaviours – those he calls in fact “instinctive”, “natural” 
or “primitive” (Wittgenstein 1967, §545), – are not 
different from the child’s behaviour who (naturally) 
sucks the maternal milk or from that of the cat which 
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(naturally) hunts the mouse or from that of the squirrel 
which (naturally) hoards food in the Summer it will need 
during the Winter. As “[t]he squirrel does not infer by 
induction that it is going to need stores next winter as 
well”, the like “no more we need a law of induction to 
justify our actions or our predictions” (Wittgenstein 
1969b, §287). In this sense, we are like children, cats and 
squirrels when, for instance, we attempt “without 
thinking” to aid someone hurt:  
 
[I]t is a primitive reaction to take care of, to 
treat, the place that hurts when someone else is 
in pain, and not merely when one is so oneself” 
(Wittgenstein 1980a, I, §915).  
  
An example used by Wittgenstein at least twice, that of 
art and of the Egyptian style, may help us understand 
better what really is at stake here.
32
 Wittgenstein starts 
by observing that we could easily assume the 
prospective representation of humans and of other 
things is correct when “compared with [the] Egyptian 
way of drawing them” (Wittgenstein 1993, 387); and we 
could thus be tempted to conclude that Egyptian art is 
incomplete precisely because it lacks – as became 
evident after the Renaissance invention of prospective – 
the perspective. But would we be right to draw to such a 
conclusion? In order to understand why Wittgenstein’s 
reply is negative, one may further articulate his example 
by comparison with other four cases: an Egyptian 
painting, one by Paolo Uccello, a Cubist work, a drawing 
by an art novice. In the case of Paolo Uccello’s painting 
we may maintain it is fully (perhaps obsessively) 
perspectival; of the novice’s drawing we could say, at a 
glance, that the rules of perspective were not applied 
                                                 
32
 They are the examples on the Egyptian style in the 
Philosophical Investigations: “Compare a concept with a 
style of painting. For is even our style of painting 
arbitrary? Can we choose one at pleasure? (The 
Egyptian, for instance.) Or is it just a matter of pretty and 
ugly?” (Wittgenstein 2009, II, xii, §367) and in the 
annotations of the years 1937-1938 published with the 
title Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness (Wittgenstein 
1993, 387). 
correctly, while the Cubist work we may affirm did 
deliberately break them. But what should we say of the 
Egyptian painting? As a matter of fact, it appears we 
cannot say anything of what we said respectively of 
Paolo Uccello’s painting, the Cubist work and the 
novice’s drawing. Indeed, Egyptian artists did neither 
apply nor not-apply nor apply in an incorrect way the 
rules of perspective, because perspective was no option 
for that painting style. To blame Egyptian art for lacking 
the perspective is, thus, like reproaching a checkers 
player because she didn’t checkmate the king. 
Still, someone may insist that it is provable that 
Egyptian art is lacking something, that is, by the fact that 
in front of Egyptian paintings we can easily ascertain that 
“after all, people don’t really look like that” 
(Wittgenstein 1993, 287). This would prove we have 
here, nevertheless, a standard “in nature” (remember 
Wittgenstein 1969a, 19). A painting without the 
perspective thus wouldn’t be like a chess game without 
pawns, but rather as a treatise or pomology without the 
European crab apples. According to Wittgenstein, 
however, this cannot at all “count as an argument” as his 
query which concludes this annotation demonstrates: 
“Who says I want people on paper to look the way they 
do in reality?” (Wittgenstein 1987, 387). As is obvious, 
the answer goes that no one is saying this, neither the 
nature of art nor human nature. Hence, why should we 
say this to the Egyptians (and with which right and what 
for)? 
However, we may go on asking, don’t we risk thus 
forgetting what Wittgenstein himself recalled in a 
famous passage of the Philosophical Investigations, 
when he observes that, while it surely happens that 
“new types of language, new language-games, as we 
may say, come into existence”, it also happens that 
“other become obsolete and get forgotten” 
(Wittgenstein 2009, I, §23)? At least in some cases, 
shouldn’t we be able to say, in fact, that if a game was 
forgotten this happened because it was finally 
discovered it wasn’t a game, for instance because its 
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rules contained a contradiction? Wittgenstein’s mode of 
responding to these questions and puzzlements can be 
illustrated by means of an example from the Remarks on 
the Foundations of Mathematics. Let’s thus imagine a 
game that “is such that whoever begins can always win 
by a particular simple trick”. No one did however notice 
his fact; hence we can say it is a game: it is played and 
anyone who plays tries to win. But “[n]ow someone 
draws our attention to it [the trick it contains]; — and it 
stops being a game”. (Wittgenstein 1978, III, §77). This 
conclusion, as Wittgenstein immediately acknowledges, 
is ambiguous though; indeed, he promptly asks how he 
should turn things around, “to make it clear to myself”. 
As a matter of fact, one may think that, by revealing 
the trick, we discover that what we have been playing 
was not a game at all (it seemed to be a game, but it 
actually wasn't) and that therefore, and properly 
speaking, up to now we have not been playing. But this 
isn’t exactly what Wittgenstein really wants to say: “I 
want to say: ‘and it stops being a game’ — not: ‘and we 
now see that it wasn’t a game’ (Wittgenstein 1978, III, 
§77).
 33
 What I can do, once the trick has been revealed, 
is alter the game so that, when playing, it may be 
possible to win or lose, because if one couldn’t lose, the 
game would miss its point which is winning. However, 
nothing that happens now can make the things that 
previously happened not happen: if one played, trick or 
not, one did play. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 However, we could even imagine that it continues to 
be a game for some. For example, once the trick has 
been discovered someone could react this way: “What a 
great game! And so relaxing! Everyone has the certainty 
that, when it's their turn to begin, they'll win.” 
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